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RECENT CASE NOTES
DEFAMATION-PRIVILEGED OCCASION-PUBLICATION TO A CLERK OR STEN-
ORAPHER-Plaintiff, in operating a public house, sold beer supplied by de-
fendants who were brewers. Plaintiff wrote to defendant complaining of
the poor quality of the beer causing their business to decline. In reply B,
a member of defendant firm, dictated to a typist a letter addressed to plain-
tiff alleging that plaintiff deliberately watered the beer. The court found
the question to be whether or not privilege is lost by communicating to a
staff of clerks the alleged defamatory matter and held, that the privilege
covers all incidents of the transmission and treatment of such privileged
communications which are in accordance with the reasonable and usual
course of business. Osborn v. Thomas Boulter & Son, L. R. (1930) 2 K. B.
226.
In reaching their decision the court found that the occasion was priv-
ileged and that it is in accordance with the reasonable and usual course of
business for a business man to dictate his business letters to a typist, even
though such letters may contain statements defamatory of a third person.
It is suggested that since defamatory statements made directly to the
plaintiff and not in the presence of a third person are not actionable be-
cause there is no publication-which is an essential element of plaintiff's
case-there is no question of privilege except in cases of communication
to a third person. As privilege presupposes publication the question of
privilege does not arise if there has been no publication. Therefore it
would seem that the question involved in the principle case is not that of
the extent of a privilege but is the question of publication; whether the
communication of defamatory matter to a typist, in the usual course of
conducting a correspondence constitutes a publication? If it be found that
such a communication is a publication, then the further question arises
of whether or not such a publication is privileged when the letter contain-
ing the defamatory statements is addressed to the person defamed or when
it is addressed to a third person to whom such communication is privileged.
However, in such cases, the courts do not always distinguish between the
distinct questions of publication and privilege, probably because the same
considerations that control the conclusion on one question will determine
the decision of the other. These courts have for the most part, taken the
problem to be whether or not such a communication to a typist in the ordin-
ary course of business constitutes an actionable publication.
Probably the first English case on this point was that of Lawless v.
Anglo-Egyptian Co. (1869) L. R. 4 Q B. 262 in which it was held that the
delivery of a report of the directors of a stock company which contained
a libelous reference to the manager of the company, to a printer, to make
copies for distribution among stockholders, was not such a publication as
prevented the communication from being privileged as "it was not sug-
gested that the directors had departed in any way from what was the usual
course, having regard to the exigencies of business and the necessary
means of making known that which they thought ought to be made known
to the stockholders at large."
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In the leading case of Pullmn v. Hill (1891) 1 Q. B. 524, however, it
was held that the dictation of defamatory matter by an officer of a lim-
ited company to a stenographer employed by the company was a publica-
tion, and further that such publication was not privileged since defendants
had neither duty nor interest in making the communication to the stenog-
rapher who likewise had no interest; and also that the writing of defama-
tory matter is not in the ordinary course of business. But in Boxsius v.
Fr4res aad others, (1894) 1 Q. B. 842, the same court, distinguishing from
Pillnzan v. Hill, held that although it was not the usual course in a mer-
chant's business to write letters containing defamatory statements and to
communicate them to a clerk, it was usual in the course of a solicitor's
business where the solicitor was instructed to write such matter in behalf
of a client on a privileged occasion.
In Harper v. Hamilton Retail Grocers' Assoc., (1900) 37 Can. L. J. 31
where the alleged libelous matter, relating to defendant's business was
given to a typist to copy, it was held that there was no such publication
to the typist as would render defendant liable. But in Moran v. O'Regan
(1907) 38 N. B. 189 and 399, the Canadian court followed Pullmnan v. Hill,
supra, although a part of the court regarded that case as not controlling
in view of its limitation by a subsequent decision of the same court. The
Pullman case was also followed in Canada in the case of Puterbaugh v.
Gold Medal Furniture Mfg Co. (1904) 7 Ont. L. Rep. 582 but a part of the
court so held only because they considered themselves bound by the Pullman
case.
In the case of Ednwndson v. Birch & Co. (1907) 1 K. B. 371, which is
approved and said to be followed by the court in the principle case, the
true question of the extent of privilege was presented. In this case a com-
pany in Japan temporarily engaged the services of the plaintiff subject
to the approval of the defendant company, their principalg in London. The
defamatory statements were made in a letter to the company in Japan
which was dictated by defendant's managing director to a clerk. The court
held that the privileged occasion covered such a publication to clerks in the
reasonable and ordinary course of business.
The case of Boxsius v. Frares, supra, was again followed in Morgan v.
Wallis (1917) 33 Times L. R. 495, in which it was held that the mere dic-
tation by a solicitor to a typist, as a matter of office routine, of a bill of
costs containing defamatory matter which was revelent and reasonably
necessary for the information of the client to whom it was to be sent, was
not actionable, saying that it did not constitute a publication.
And in Roff v. British Chemical Co. (1918) 2 K. B. 677 it was held
that the privilege of the occasion was not lost by the publication to the
clerks of the firm to which the privileged communication had been sent by
defendants, approving Edmondson v. Birch and distinguishing Pullman V.
Hill.
Taking the English Authority as a whole including the principal case,
it would seem that the rule attempted to be, or intended to be laid down is
that a communication made to a stenographer or clerk etc. in the reason-
able and ordinary course of business is a privileged publication and there-
fore is not actionable. Such a rule is broad and liberal and seems to be
expressive of the general views of the English courts toward this situ-
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ation. Under this rule it would make no difference to whom the letter is
addressed. The fact that the letter is written and communication is made
in the ordinary course of business would be controlling. It is doubtful,
however, what position would be taken by the English courts in a case
where the defendant dictates to the typist a defamatory letter addressed to
one to whom such communication is not privileged. Such a case would
compel recognition of the distinction between publication and privilege.
In the United States there is a real controversy on this point. The cases
are not entirely in harmony but the weight of authority at the present
time seems to favor the view that such a communication to a clerk is not
privileged and is actionable.
Probably the first case on the point was Kiene v. Ruff, (1855) 1 Iowa
482 in which it was held that where a libelous letter written in a foreign
language was given by the writer to a third person to transcribe and the
copy was forwarded to a foreign country a publication was made in this
country.
The leading American case however is Owen v. Ogilvie Pub. Co., (1898)
53 N. Y. Supp. 1033, where the manager of a corporation dictated the
libelous letter to a stenographer employed by the corporation. The court
distinguished the case from Kiene v. Ruff and held that the dictation,
copying and mailing constituted but a single act of the corporation, and
did not amount to a publication to a third person.
On the other hand, in Gambrill v. Schooley, (1901) 93 Md. 48 the early
English view expressed in Pullman v. Hill was followed and adopted; and
also in Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Bailey, (1903) 101 Va. 443, there is dictum
to the effect that publication may be made by dictation to a stenographer.
And, following Gambrill v. Schooley, it was held in Ferdon v. Dickens (1909)
161 Ala. 181, that the dictation to a stenographer was sufficient publica-
tion although there was no communication of the defamatory matter to any
other person. This was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama in
Berry v. City of N. Y. Ins. Co., (1923) 98 So. 290.
Georgia followed the rule of the Ogilvie case in Central of Ga. Ry. Co.
v. Jones, (1916) 18 Ga. App. 414, holding that the stenographer is not
to be regarded as a third person in the sense that the dictation and mailing
of the letter and the stenographer's knowledge of it constitute a publication
of a libel. Mississippi and Washington are also in accord with this view,
Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel, (1917) 113 Miss. 359, and Prins v. Ho.
land-North America Mtge. Co. (1919) 181 Pac. 680.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, in Globe Furn. Co. v.
Wright, (1920) 265 Fed. 873, held that the occasion was conditionally priv-
ileged in that the general manager and the bookkeeper by whom the letter
was written and a collector to whom it was shown had a duty to perform
for the employer respecting the letter. This case adds nothing, however, to
either side of the controversy as a true case of privilege was presented by
reason of the fact that each of these persons was interested in the libelous
information in the performance of their duties. But the United States Dis-
trict Court of the Eastern District of New York, in the case of Nelson V.
Whitten, (1921) 272 Fed. 135, adopted the reasoning of Pullman v. Hill and
held that the dictation was an actionable publication of a libel. This case
however may be distinguished on the facts because the communication was
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not made in the course of any business but was contained in a reply to a
letter from the plaintiff asking for a letter respecting his services while in
the defendant's employ as captain of a certain vessel.
In Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corp., (1925) 208 N. Y. Supp. 625, the doc-
trine laid down in the Ogilvie case is again approved and followed citing
that case and Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Jones. But an opinion was handed
down on June 21, 1930 in the case of Ostrowe v. Lee, 244 N. Y. Supp. 28,
holding that the dictation of a defamatory letter to a stenographer in the
instant case was an actionable publication" and saying that the Ogilvie and
Belstrat Hotel Cases constitute an exception to the rule that dictation to
a stenographer is a publication, for the reason that the defamer in those
cases were corporations.
The rationale of the more liberal cases seems to be that dictation of
defamatory matter to a stenographer is a reasonable and ordinary course
of business, and for this reason (1) is a publication, but (a) is itself priv-
ileged if addressed to the person defamed, (b) is within the privilege if
addressed to one between whom and the defamed there is a privilege; (2)
is not a publication at all (a) if written by a corporation, (b) if written
to the person defamed, or (c) to one who is privileged to receive the de-
famatory letter. S. J. S.
EviENc--Res Gestae-RELEVANcY-A truck driver alleged to have
been driving negligently struck the plaintiff while making a delivery for
his principle. The statements of the driver made immediately after the
accident were admitted by the lower court in answer to the question-
"What was the first statement made by Mr. Van Strohn immediately after
the collision?" The defendant moved to strike out the following answer
as not a part of the res gestae: "Don't call the police; we are covered by
insurance; I have two deliveries to make-I am late." The trial court re-
fused to strike out the statements and the defendant appeals. Held, the
answer should be stricken out. The statement does not throw light upon
the facts of the collision and it does not measure up to the requirements
of res gestae. Red Star Yeast Co. v. Shackleford, Appellate Court of Indi-
ana, May 2, 1930, 171 N. E. 302.
The answer to be a part of the res gestae must be spontaneous, non-
self-serving, and made approximately at the time of the accident. Harrison
v. U. S., 200 Fed. 674, 119 C. C. A. 78; Louisville Ry. Co. v. Buck, 116 Ind.
556, 19 N. E. 453. The least evidence of narration or fabrication will ex-
clude the statements as a part of the res gestae. Stephenson v. State, 110
Ind. 358, 11 N. E. 360. Chicago Division Ry. Co. v. State, 128 Ill. 545.
Does the statement of the witness in the principle case show that it is
fabricated, self serving or reasoned? The statement when examined shows
plainly that it is a reasoned one. It was made for the purpose of persuad-
ing the plaintiff or others near the accident to allow the driver to continue
upon his deliveries without delay. It was spoken with design. Louisville
Ry. Co. v. Bnck, 116 Ind. 556, 19 N. E. 453. And should therefore be
stricken. People v. Lawrence, 143 Cal. 148, 76 Pac. 893; People v. Wil-
liamns, 127 Calif. 216, 59 Pac. 581.
But the action before the court was one for damages alleged to have
arisen out of the negligent acts of defendant's agent, who made this state-
ment in question. Can the assertions of the agent be said to aid in deter-
